Max Marder

Politics and economics are complicated pursuits, and as such, everyone from experts to casual conversationalists has a tendency to compare complicated phenomena to comparable incidents, hoping to inject some order into the chaos. Is Occupy Wall Street like the Tea Party? Is the financial crisis of 2008 like the Great Depression? Is Egypt like Tunisia? Is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad like Adolf Hitler?

These questions make for interesting debates but often obfuscate the matter at hand, reducing policy dilemmas to a cost-benefit analysis based on the most recent problem of a similar nature. Policymakers in economics and politics tend too often to make such simplifying comparisons. Too often our decisions are based on preventing the previous crisis instead of forecasting the next one.

This type of thinking is now being applied to the crisis in Syria from two different angles. There is currently a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution on the docket that would call for President Bashar Assad to step down and transfer power to his deputy.

On one side, the Russian Foreign Ministry, led by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, argues against the resolution on the grounds that it will precipitate an international military intervention akin to that in Libya.

Coterminously, the United States and its European allies are supporting the measure, which would pave the way for a government of national unity. A similar deal has been implemented in Yemen. By no means is it unanimously popular or is it ensured to be effective. Brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the agreement has facilitated the departure of Yemen’s President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, into exile.

Here’s the problem: Syria is not Libya and Syria is not Yemen. Assad is neither Qaddafi nor Saleh.

Let’s start with Russia. Ostensibly its opposition to the UNSC resolution condemning Bashar Assad, who has killed well over 5500 of his citizens, amounts to invoking the sovereignty of a nation-state. The Libyan intervention irked the Russians, who felt that they were duped into supporting regime change by supporting a measure which was cloaked as a mandate to protect civilians. “I don’t think Russian policy is about asking people to step down. Regime change is not our profession,” said FM Lavrov.

The differences between Syria and Libya are staggering. A no-fly zone would not be the method of intervention in Syria since the majority of the fighting is waged on the ground and in urban environments laden with civilians. There is no unified armed Syrian rebellion. The Syrian crisis has lasted much longer and claimed more lives than the Libyan crisis when NATO intervened. The Libyan intervention swung the tide in favor of the rebels whereas an intervention in Syria would have much more of a burden in ousting Mr. Assad. Assad wears suits and Qaddafi wore eccentric tunics. Et cetera.

Not least of all, the resolution on the table regarding Syria would not necessarily lead to intervention at all. Few in Washington or Brussels are keen on intervention right now, not to mention some of the Syrian opposition. Russia has negotiated, offering support for resolutions condemning Assad so long as they equate the President with those protesting against him and proscribe any sort of future intervention. Other members of the UNSC have rejected the Russian counteroffer on the grounds that it would set a precedent for binding future resolutions.

The Russian invocation of Libya as a justification for opposing a resolution calling for Bashar al Assad to step down is disingenuous. Moscow wasn’t fooled into thinking the Libyan intervention wouldn’t put pressure on Qaddafi. The Colonel was simply less of an asset to Russian interests than is Mr. Assad.

Just as Chinese internet censors blocked the word ‘jasmine’ from internet searches after Zine el Abidine Ben Ali fled Tunisia, Russia does not want to lend support to a principle (UNSC resolutions calling for regime change) that could trouble its own undemocratic leadership in the future. The Syrian port of Tarsus is also the Russian navy’s only outlet to the Mediterranean Sea and the Putin regime accrues lucrative profits from arms sales and other business with Damascus. With his return to the Kremlin approaching, Mr. Putin can win points by defying the West.

As for the other side of the coin, the resolution itself (besides the fact that it won’t transcend a Russian veto) is tragically flawed. It is modeled after the GCC-brokered peace deal, implemented on January 22^nd, aimed at ending the political crisis in Yemen.

Yet the resolution has hardly ended the crisis definitively. Under the terms of the agreement, Yemen’s President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, has left the country in order to seek “medical treatment” in the United States. He transferred power to his longtime deputy, which the Syrian UNSC resolution would also stipulate. In return he received immunity from prosecution.

There are a plethora of problems with the deal. Most importantly, it doesn’t bar Saleh from returning to Yemen or participating substantially in the upcoming “government of national unity.” He says that he will return to Sana’a after his treatment. Also, his deputy and vice-president, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, is the sole candidate in Yemen’s upcoming presidential elections on February 21^st—hardly a sign of sweeping reform.

Furthermore, Saleh only accepted the GCC deal because it granted him immunity—as  approved by the Yemeni parliament, which has enraged the street. It is morally dubious, and perhaps politically unstable, for Saleh not to face retribution for ordering the deaths of peaceful protesters.

What’s most galling about the debates among Security Council diplomats over the resolution and its wording is that nothing Bashar Assad has said or done over the past 11 months would indicate that he’d ever accept a Saleh-like deal. He was resolute and defiant in his speech on January 10^th. He’s made it abundantly clear that reform, exile and surrender are not options—especially since he can cling to power with the army’s support so long as the international community supports non-intervention. As Tony Karon writes in TIME, “Assad is not about to heed a resolution put before the Security Council by the Arab League — and backed by Western powers — that bluntly demands his surrender, because that outcome does not reflect the balance of forces on the ground.”

What we have on our hands with Syria is a resolution, modeled simplistically after a highly flawed deal that treated a murderous autocrat gently, which will be vetoed by Russia, and would not have been accepted by Bashar al Assad anyway. Ironically, it seems that the Russians are rejecting a resolution on the grounds that its reminiscent of action that was largely successful (Libya) while the US and Europe are supporting it because it’s evocative of a measure that’s thoroughly problematic (GCC deal in Yemen).

So what should be done?

First, enough of the erroneous comparisons to other countries. We must learn from history but not be constrained by it. Many of the objections to foreign intervention in Syria are based on specious comparisons to Iraq circa 2003 (similar warnings were aired about Libya). Again, the differences are profound, not least of all because the Arab League has been somewhat punitive in dealing with Syria and could yet support more robust measures to dislodge Assad. Syria is not Libya, nor Yemen, nor Iraq.

Secondly, the United Nations is probably a dead end. Moscow and Beijing are not keen on intervention in Syria, and their vetoes would preclude a consensus for such action.

Thirdly, it’s not enough to condemn Assad and say that his fall is inevitable. As Steven Cook argues in the Atlantic, “if the international community wants to see the end of the Assad regime, as virtually everyone claims, then it is likely going to require outside intervention. Nothing that anyone has thrown at Damascus has altered its behavior.” These are indeed valid arguments against intervention, the most compelling being that the Syrian opposition has yet to unanimously embrace the idea itself. Cook rightly asks “at what point in the body count is international intervention deemed to be an acceptably worthwhile option that can have a positive effect on the situation? After Assad has killed 6,000 people? 7,000? 10,000? 20,000?”

In conclusion, once the situation evolves to the point where the Syrian opposition calls categorically for international help, the world must be ready to answer. Those who have bashed Assad verbally must be ready to act. Most of the Syrian National Council (SNC) now endorses intervention of some kind, but the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) is much more wary. An American-European-Arab League-Turkish cooperative effort is not unimaginable. It would circumvent Russia and China’s vetoes, as well as concerns about Western imperialism, the other most compelling argument against intervention. Moscow and Tehran may have allies in Damascus, but they would be unlikely to wage a proxy war to cement Assad’s rule in the face of an international coalition with broad legitimacy.

Other opponents of intervention say that military action in Syria is against US interests. “Let Syrians work it out,” the logic goes, or “we have enough problems of our own.” However, the toppling of the Assad regime is in the US interest—in the short-term, Iran would grieve the loss of its biggest ally. But on a more important and more abstract note, intervention is in the US interest precisely because it’s not in the US interest.

I’ll explain.

The US must alter its image in the Middle East—which is endemic and loathed—away from being a frigid manipulator solely in pursuit of its own self-interest.  Liberalism is the new realism. It is in the United States’ long-term self-interest to forge a more positive relationship with the Arab street, the future stakeholders of Middle Eastern political affairs. Shadi Hamid writes that we must undertake the “difficult work of re-orienting U.S. foreign policy, to align ourselves, finally, with our own ideals.”

Most toxic is the thinking that Assad is the least worst option for Syria’s future. There are better alternatives than having his rule reach 2013, which would likely leave another 5,500 or more dead in his wake.

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has beseeched the global community, and the UNSC, to resolve the Syrian crisis. Quoted in an article in Al Ahram, “The Council, he said, must be ‘united this time, speak and act in a coherent manner…reflecting the urgent wishes and aspirations of the Syrian people.’” Unfortunately, neither the Council nor the international community is united or speaking coherently at the moment.

This morning, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gave his third public speech since the revolution against his rule began 11 months ago. Unsurprisingly, the mustachioed dictator unleashed all of the most hackneyed themes from the Arab Tyrant’s Manual, emphasizing repeatedly over the course of his brutal 90 minute filibuster foreign interference in Syrian affairs should be blamed for the protracted political crisis.

The dull and monotonous Assad weaved indecipherably between blaming the West, “terrorists,” Gulf interference, the Muslim Brotherhood, Israel, Al Jazeera and Arab traitors for the injustice in his country which has seen more than 6000 people die since February. Assad brilliantly intertwined the same themes promulgated in the past by Saddam, Muammar, and Hosni into his marathon performance.

Users on Twitter commented that the members of the audience were being put to sleep by Bashar’s soporific invective, awakening only to rounds of applause that seemed to be issued by command.

His father Hafez would be proud.

Assad’s contradictions were numerous. His scapegoats were abundant. He pledged to reform but then said that “terrorists” must be crushed with an iron fist. He belittled the Arab League for “betraying” Syria, the “heart of the Arab League,” while still welcoming an inter-Arab resolution to the conflict. He blamed all of the West and Arab hypocrites for the conflict before asserting that Syria was secure and had “many friends.”

He used many common platitudes from the Arab dictator playbook—so much so that it seems entirely possible that Bashar’s father Hafez or the late Qaddafi could’ve written his speech. He numerously returned to the topic of the Palestinians, trying to take ownership of a cause he’s never genuinely championed while disparaging Israel. Ostensibly this tactic was an attempt to attract broad appeal from the rest of the Muslim world. Too bad that trick has been tried time and time again to no avail.  

He spent much of the speech attempting to construct an Arab and Islamic legitimacy that he’s never truly had. Any pedigree he did have surely disappeared during the perpetual violence of the last year, at least in most people’s consideration. He spoke perplexing about “Arabism,” insinuating in ultra-nationalist terms that Syria was the paragon of Arab honor and culture and that the Arab League and critics of his regime were non-Arabs and Orientalists.

At one point, Assad praised Syria’s burgeoning olive harvested industry. Later, he ridiculed the opposition for destroying the world renowned Syrian education system’s attendance rates. He said that a government of national unity was not needed because Syria was not divided. It seemed that his accusations and logic were so ludicrous that no one, not even Assad himself, could possibly agree with it in earnest.

From his circuitous diatribes and steadfast commitment to his own innocence, it is now clearer than ever that reform is not an option in Syria. Activists reported that during Assad’s speech, a handful of protesters had been killed. Assad left no room for his own exit, making vague references to allowing more parties into the system and a constitutional referendum in the spring. So far the only registered party other than his own is another Baathist party. His ramblings validate the unfortunate fact that the Arab League observer mission served no other purpose other than to buy him more time.

He framed the crisis as being a race between “terrorists and reformists.” He claimed that he’s been opening up the country since he came to power in 2000. Most of the Syrian protesters would say that they are the ‘reformers,’ the government the ‘terrorists.’

So what does this all mean? Essentially, that nothing has changed. Given Assad’s bombastic pontifications, few are likely to have changed the perception they had of him this time yesterday. Assad won’t back down. Peaceful protesters will continue to die. And Assad’s doctrinaire commitment to his categorical rightness suggests that the violence will escalate.

It’s hard to see how the speech could have helped Mr. Assad. Similar speeches by his colleagues, Mubarak and Qaddafi, rallied more support for the opposition against them. The hope is that the actors who have the power to change the tide of the crisis will realize once and for all that Bashar has no motivation to negotiate or forge a peaceful, political solution to the crisis. In essence, he has said that the only way he will leave power is by taking the Qaddafi option.

An inter-Arab solution is undoubtedly the ideal option. We can hope against hope that the Arab League has seen Assad’s speech and rethought their hesitancy to act. We can hope against hope that the Foreign Ministries in Moscow and Beijing are alight with activity. Perhaps there will be renewed expediency in the Security Council. 

A Kurdish activist, quoted in an article in Al Jazeera, put it well: “The president’s speech led Syria into a new era of bloodshed. From his words I understood that the coming days will be bloodier with even more security and military crackdown. I was gambling on a very small window of hope but now I can say there is no hope from the regime and no hope for Assad to make real reforms.”

Only minutes after Assad left the podium at Damascus University, Burhan Ghalioun, the leader of the opposition Syrian National Council, gave a press conference. Ghalioun, whose chairmanship of the opposition group had just been extended for another month, said in no uncertain terms that Assad was in denial.

The Paris-based activist said that Assad was attempting to divide Syrians, and that the faith the opposition had in the Arab League had evaporated. He vowed to bring the matter to the Security Council once again while the opposition persisted in popular resistance to the regime in cooperation with the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change and the Free Syrian Army, a group of defectors from the army.

Expect more turbulence, because there’s no end in sight.